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ABSTRACT
Since its inception in 1790, the U.S. patent system has been
inextricably linked to innovation, the dissemination of knowledge, and
numerous other societal benefits. The adoption of a patent claiming
system in 1836 has resulted in a series of historical trends, including. (1)
the century-plus trend of yearly increases in applications, straining the
agency beyond its capabilities,- (2) a highly labor-intensive examination
process,- and, (3) the majority ofpatents issued have been valueless.
Today the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is in a self-
described workload crisis and under attack for quality concerns.
Former Under Secretary and PTO Director James E. Rogan
carefully articulated these problems. Through his leadership, Rogan
successfully championed a series of initiatives to modernize the PTO. His
central theme was modernizing the agency and transforming its nineteenth
century business model for the twenty-first century. However, patent
reform has become increasingly difficult recently due to the rigors of the
legislative process and political considerations.
This Article applies game theory, a branch of applied mathematics,
to propose a new patent reform whereby the PTO focuses more resources
on more rigorous examination offewer applications. Empirical patent
scholars have concluded that only a smallfraction of all patents are
"valuable, " and scarce examination resources are not properly allocated.
Economists liken the patent system to a lottery--individuals seek windfall
rewards for their efforts.
The Article's proposed examination paradigm avoids arbitrary
and irrational resource allocation by applying a market-based
mechanism. an auction. An auction will discourage lottery strategies and
helps weed out worthless applications. Since our history and tradition
encourage promoting innovation and entrepreneurship broadly, the
proposal offers inventors a choice for the legal protection of their
inventions. Through an auction, inventors could vie for an application's
full-scale examination. Alternatively, they would be eligible for another
* 1994, J.D., Temple University School of Law; 1990, B.S., University of Pennsylvania.
The Author has worked on patent law and policy in all three branches of the federal
government: law clerk to the Hon. Pauline Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit; Director of Congressional Relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
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type ofprotection (e.g., a petty patent). Nobel Laureate William Vickrey
pioneered a sealed bid, second price variety of auction. It is an ideal
mechanism for the allocation of scarce public sector resources, and is also
appropriate in the patent context. It permits the more robust examination
of a smaller set of applications. This will help ease the PTO's workload
crisis, discourage specious applications, and hence enhance patent
quality. The Vickrey auction does not seek to maximize revenue so as to
punish new inventors, small businesses, and non-profits. Rather, it
dynamically finds the most optimal price for government examination
services.
This Article's new paradigm promises to break the century-plus
cycle of dysfunction and offer public policy benefits for each of the
participants and society at large.
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INTRODUCTION
"This [Patent Office crisis] is enough to make a person turn
Bolshevik when we consider that the inventors are paying all of the
Office expenses and that they are entitled to prompt action. "1
"As some have said in the past, we [Patent Office examiners]
produce Chevys, not Cadillacs."
2
Since Congress first established the Nation's patent system with
the 1790 Patent Act, the U.S. patent system has been inextricably linked to
innovation, research and development investment, and controversy.3 This
Article is the first in a series to explore how the application of game
theory4 principles can improve the patent system through enhancing patent
examination quality and Patent Office operations. The Article concludes
that patent reform must focus on Patent Office operations. This conclusion
is true whether one subscribes to the view that inventors deserve prompt
action from the Patent Office or the view that too many specious patent
claims are approved, and hence, overall quality is poor. This conclusion
naturally flows from a number of uncontroverted assumptions about the
role of the patent system in our society and the nation's economy. These
assumptions focus on how the patent system's users and other players
interrelate (e.g., patent applicants, the patent employee unions, and
political entities), their behavior, and the application of certain game
theory and applied economics principles. This Article proposes a new
examination system based on economic and game theory as a means of
breaking the century-plus cycle of dysfunction. Under this Article's
proposed regime, the Patent Office may use its budget and resources for a
more focused examination of a smaller, more valuable subset of
1 Ford W. Harris, Letter to the Editor, 3 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 444,446 (1921).
2 The Operations of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Qffice Including Review of Agency
Funding: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Courts and Intellectual Property of the H
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 27 (2001) (statement of Ronald J. Stern, President
of the Patent Office Professional Association (POPA)). The Author notes that Ronald
Stem's testimony is quoting former Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Patents William
Feldman.
3 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109; William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws:
Forging Legislation Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 9 (2006) (outlining the centuries-old controversies surrounding the Patent Act).
4 "In some ways the name 'game theory' is unfortunate, for it suggests that the theory
deals with only the socially unimportant conflicts found in parlor games, whereas it is far
more general than that." R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS,
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 2 (1985). Game theory, for the purposes of this
paper, is defined so as to include the process of maximizing the outcome of a conflict or
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applications, thereby enhancing overall quality, weeding out many patents
with poor or defective claims, and eliminating wasteful practices.
This Article examines the recent history surrounding the problems,
policies, and politics inherent in the Patent Office's operations. It then
proposes a solution in the form of a new examination model derived from
game theory and applied economic principles, particularly the Vickrey
auction. Part I provides an introduction that summarizes the history of the
issues at the heart of the matter. Part II examines the practical and political
issues and obstacles facing the Patent Office and its mission to process an
ever burgeoning workload while struggling with patent quality issues.
Likewise, Part II briefly reviews some of the political and practical
obstacles the Office has faced in the context of previous legislative patent
reforms. Part III explains how game theory and applied economics can be
a valuable tool for public institutions in a variety of contexts. Part IV
outlines a proposal to use game theory, specifically a hybrid auction
mechanism, to enhance Patent Office operations and enhance patent
quality. Part IV also attempts to address some of the inevitable concerns
that this novel reform proposal will elicit. Finally, Part V places this novel
proposal into perspective in light of long-standing trends.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
The nation's intellectual property laws, as enacted by Congress,
reflect the values imbued in the U.S. Constitution's grant "[lt]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.",5 For more than two centuries, the nation's intellectual
property system has balanced a set of policy objectives, including
stimulating innovation, incentivizing financial investment, and promoting
competition through a nationally uniform legal framework of rules.6 The
legal instruments that provide intellectual property protection under
federal law are patents (for inventions),7 copyrights (for original works of
authorship),8 trademarks (for words, slogans, or logos), 9 semiconductor
5 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
6 Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection qf Inventions Meeting Judicial
Standards of Patentability, 87 HARv. L. REv. 807, 819 (1974) (explaining the purpose of
intellectual property laws and the constancy of its policy objectives).
7 Under the Patent Act, patentable inventions include "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... ." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
8 The Copyright Act defines the scope of the subject matter of copyright for original
works of authorship to include "literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works." 17
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chip masks, 10 and vessel hull designs.11 State law provides protection for
the rights of publicity and privacy (for famous personae) 12  and trade
secrets (for proprietary information ranging from tangible inventions to
compilations of information and databases). One noteworthy aspect of
patent protection under the current U.S. system is that it requires an
affirmative act by the state to obtain any protection, unlike many other
species of intellectual property. In contrast, one may obtain a copyright,
trademark, or trade secret merely upon creation and use. The additional
step of federal registration provides the author or mark owner additional
privileges under the copyright and trademark systems. A patent, on the
other hand, is entirely a creature of federal law, and requires the
government to examine an application. 13
The Patent Office ("PTO") is thus interposed between the inventor
and the public, 14 serving as a gatekeeper for the public's storehouse of
knowledge 15 and the nation's economic investment. 16 The PTO examines
patent applications, makes a determination regarding the patent's validity,
and grants patents in accordance with the requirements of the Patent Act
17
and proffered evidence of the innovation's advancement beyond the
9 Trademarks "includ[e] any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof"
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159
(1995).
10 17 U.S.C. § 901 (1984).
1117 U.S.C. § 1301 (1998).
12 The right of publicity, generally a state right, is defined as: "The right of an individual,
especially a public figure or celebrity, to control commercial value and exploitation of his
name or picture or likeness to prevent others from unfairly appropriating that value for
their commercial benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (6th ed. 1990).
13 Property in patents exists solely by virtue of federal statute (the Patent Act) and
accordingly defined under federal law. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach.
Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) ("Patent property is the creature of [federal] statute law
and [the] incidents [of that property] are equally so and depend upon ... [those patent]
statutes ...in view of the policy of Congress in their enactment .... "); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (8 Pet.) (1834).
14 Throughout this Article, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, an agency of the U.S.
Department of Commerce, is also referred to as the "Patent Office." .PTO," and "the
agency."
15 See Chris J. Katopis, Patents v. Patients: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 329, 340 (1997) [hereinafter Patents v. Patients].
16 Id. at 341 (discussing the "prospect" and "innovation" theories surrounding economic
incentives for research and investment in terms of economic theory).
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existing prior art. is In essence, it assesses the breadth of the patent claims
submitted. 19 Should the PTO grant too much patent protection to
inventors, society is harmed by having the public domain reduced through
an overbroad monopoly. Likewise, should the PTO insufficiently review
the patent application and fail to grant the correct scope of protection,
several negatives consequences follow: namely, the inventor will not
receive the full quantum of rights sought, the level of investment will
likely be less than optimal, and society will not benefit from the disclosure
that results when a patent is eventually published.
A fundamental, and too often overlooked, benefit underlying the
patent system is the quid pro quo of public disclosure in exchange for the
limited patent monopoly.20 The benefits of the patent system's disclosure
requirement may be illustrated in many ways. The most tangible, if not
notable, result is the fact that the PTO's electronic patent records of the
more than seven million granted patents and published applications now
comprise the world's largest transactional database.
21
A patent applicant has a duty of disclosure and thus a duty "to put
the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so
as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is already
known, and to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an
invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be
patented., 22 Congress has required an applicant to state with particularity
the claimed invention in the specification since 1836.23 As the Supreme
Court has observed, the public notice function of claiming one's invention
with certainty is vital to the balance between individuals securing the
18 "Prior art" refers to the sum of publicly available scientific or engineering knowledge
and literature surrounding an existing invention. See generally KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
19 The late Giles S. Rich, longtime judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, expressed this phenomenon best: "The name of the game is the claim." Giles S.
Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims American Prospectives,
21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 497, 501 (1990)).
20 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)
(distinguishing monopolies from patents and toting the patent's system's quidpro quo);
United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897) (supporting the dual
propositions that inventions ultimately add to sum of human knowledge and the grant of
patent monopolies); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (noting that
patent system design allows the public to benefit from new inventions in exchange for
granting an inventor a temporary monopoly).
21 See, e.g., http://www.uspto.gov/patfi/index.html.
22 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822).
23 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1997);
Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix iron Co., 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 274, 278 (1877); Phillips v.
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benefits of innovation and providing notice to the public of the property
right:
The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in
claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed
from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is
foreclosed from future enterprise. A zone of uncertainty which
enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of
infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less
than unequivocal foreclosure of the field.24
In sum, the PTO serves an incredibly important national public
policy role, that of a gatekeeper for industry and the public. First, through
its examination policy, it indirectly regulates the amount of scientific and
technical information disseminated to the public. The theory is that the
information disclosed by granted patents and other applications expands
the public's storehouse of knowledge.25 Second, the PTO can dictate the
amount of economic investment flowing into all sectors of the U.S.
economy, including high technology, media, health care, industrial
research, and manufacturing.
II. THE 21s T CENTURY PTO
The PTO in the twenty-first century has the same principal mission
as it had in the nineteenth century: examining the applications of members
of the public seeking patents. Accordingly, the PTO's mission has three
operational components shaping its mission goals: workload, quality, and
infrastructure. These three areas are clearly related. Two commentators
observed the relationship among these operational components merely a
generation ago in 1973:
Do the officials of the Patent Office really care about the validity of
the patents which are issued from their agency, as long as the
production goals which they set for the patent examiners concerning
the disposal of patent applications are met? The official position of the
Patent Office is that they desire the issuance of patents of the highest
possible validity. But, in view of their actual conduct concerning
production goals, this position must be viewed as at least open to
question. As long as the officials of the Patent Office demand greater
production of disposal each year . . . it is difficult indeed for anyone
with an objective viewpoint to be convinced that they are paying
24 United Carbon Co. v. Brinney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942); see also
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). Under a patent claiming
system the applicant must "particularly 'specify and point' out what he claims as his
invention," and the scope of the patent monopoly does not extend beyond the claim.
Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854) (Campbell, J.).
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anything more than lip service to the concept of the highest possible
patent validity.
26
While the PTO's core mission remains the same today as it was
two centuries ago, it is significantly more challenging due to the sheer
number and the complexity of applications it must review. First and
foremost, the PTO's management decisions continually raise resource
allocation questions-e.g., whether the agency should invest its finite
resources in human capital, such as hiring additional examiners, or
whether acquiring superior computer systems should be a more important
priority. Though highly labor intensive, the modern patent examination
process heavily relies on computer systems and information technology
("IT") infrastructure to manage the hundreds of thousands of pending
applications and enormous prior art databases. The PTO's electronic
infrastructure is intended to help expedite the enormous workload facing
the examiners and make the examination process more efficient. Today
the quality of examination is therefore heavily dependent on the electronic
infrastructure (which provides access to various prior art databases).
The PTO's heavy reliance on computer infrastructure proves to be
mixed-both a blessing and a curse. In the Author's experience at the
PTO earlier this decade, computer outages were a frequent occurrence.
Malfunctioning systems can have a significant negative impact on the
PTO's productivity. For example, a one-hour computer outage in an
agency with only 2000 examiners results in the loss of one-person year of
productivity. This represents numerous lost opportunities and contributes
to persistent backlog and workload issues.27 In contrast, today the agency
has more than 5000 examiners and is growing steadily. Presently, a one-
hour loss of computer systems would result in a loss of more than three
person-years of productivity.
As the enormous workload issues increase, one can conclude that
the resulting patent quality will inevitably suffer. The basic factors
affecting the PTO's productivity were nicely summarized in a 1955 paper:
(1) the rate at which new applications are received;
(2) the size of the examining force;
(3) the experience and capability of the examiners; and
26 Martin R. Horn & Saul Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents A Different
View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 134, 134 (1973).
27 Note, The United States Patent Qffice: What it is. How it Functions. And What it
Needs., 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 769, 782 (1955) [hereinafter The United States Patent
Office] ("The term 'backlog' means the total number of applications pending in the
Patent Office. This total includes those applications which are awaiting action by




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360 (2008)
(4) the complexity of the inventions disclosed in the application
submitted.2 a
If one assumes that workload and quality are inextricably related, then
these productivity factors will impact the resulting examination quality.
Another factor that bears on resulting patent quality is the content of the
applicant's submitted application (e.g., the completeness of any prior art
search and the drafting of submitted claims).29
The state of the PTO today is dismal, as evidenced by its million-plus
application backlog, employee morale problems, and the chorus of
complaints concerning patent quality. While two critics recently charged
that "[p]atent reform commentators can be ... criticized for asserting the
patent system is broken without solid supporting data," 30 indeed, ample
data supports this conclusion. A 2005 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report concluded, "USPTO's resources have not kept pace with the
rising number and complexity of patent applications it must review."
31
Such disagreement concerning whether a problem even exists has resulted
in a lack of patent reform. Many critics have called for various reforms
over the decades, but the reforms spear-headed by agency officials have
been met with disappointing results.
32
History shows that the PTO's inability to contend with the rising
tide of new patent applications has dramatically escalated in recent years.
While many have discussed the recent growth in the PTO's new
application filings and inventory, it is not well-known that the PTO's
workload problems go back for more than a century. Figure 1, below,
illustrates the rise of the PTO's total application backlog from a mere 4644
in 1883 to more than one million by 2006.
28 Id. at 780.
29 A "prior art search" refers to one phase of the examination process. In this phase the
inventor-applicant or the examiner reviews all past publicly known scientific and
technical information that may bear on the patentability of the proffered invention. See
supra note 18.
30 Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: How the
PTO's Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent System with
Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 556, 559 n.12 (2006).
31 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN HIRING
EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION REMAIN 1 (2005) (GAO-05-720)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
32 See generally PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW POLICY (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/2003/10/investmentrpt.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
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Figure 1 - USPTO Total Patent Application Backlog (1883 - 2007)"3














Year (1883 - 2007)
The total application backlog may result from many factors,
including inadequate resources, poor planning, significant national events
(e.g., world wars), failure to develop efficient procedures, and the fact that
applications have become larger (i.e., include an increasing number of
claims) and more technologically complex over the past century.
The patent system is full of rich history and lore. Thomas Jefferson
is credited by history as the first patent commissioner. 34 One can imagine
him sitting at a desk in Monticello examining the Nation's first
applications. Today's basic patent examination model, whereby a
government patent examiner reviews the claims of a patent, dates back to
33 For sources from which data was compiled, see infra note 130.
34 See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1415, 1417 n.ll (1995) ("The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. Act of April 10,
1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). The 1790 Act established a group of executive officers
(the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General) who were authorized to
issue patents if the officers determined that the inventor was the 'first and true inventor'
and that the invention was 'sufficiently useful and important.' Thomas Jefferson, the first
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the Patent Act of 1836. 35 The Senate Report accompanying the Patent Act
of 1836 cited various evils in the existing system of issuing patents extant
at that time. Among the evils listed was that a "considerable portion of all
the patents granted are worthless and void ... [and this] opens the door to
frauds." 36 The necessity of an examiner evaluating the claims of
application for patentability certainly poses operational challenges. The
PTO must allot an examiner adequate time to assess the claims, thereby
balancing considerations of efficiency and quality. An imbalance in the
time-per-application by each examiner may result in two species of
dysfunction: (1) a backlog of unexamined applications; and/or (2)
resulting poor examination quality.
The long-term historical data concerning the PTO's operational
workload dysfunction has not been widely discussed in recent academic
research or by congressional oversight committees. It is, however, well-
known that the PTO has approximately one million unexamined
applications in its current inventory. While some realize that this backlog
did not occur overnight, the longevity of the problem is not generally
known to the public, congressional overseers, or the patent community.
The PTO backlog represents a systemic problem dating back to the
beginning of the last century, as illustrated by Figure 1, above. In 1883,
the PTO backlog was relatively small-a mere 4644 backlogged
applications. 37 In the 1920s, the application backlog grew to more than
100,000 (by 1934, it was approximately 112,500). 3 8 As mentioned, today
the troubling backlog has grown by an order of magnitude to seven digits.
Though the problem has existed for more than a century, it has become so
severe that it may be beyond repair.
One can only speculate as to the reasons why the PTO's backlog
has not been squarely addressed over the past century. A 1966 paper by
R.Y. Peters warned that unless there was a change in the PTO's
"manpower" and the patent "laws," a backlog of one million applications
35 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 (1997) ("The 1952 Patent Act is not materially
different from the 1870 Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO.");
see generally 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.02[2] (2007) ("The Patent Act of 1836 adopted
the rule ... that the inventor in the specification 'particularly specify and point out the
part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.'
The Patent Act of 1870 further formalized the requirement of claims . . ... ") (citation
omitted).
36 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3 n. 10 (overview).
37 Condition of Work in the U.S. Patent Qffice, 12 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 167, 168 (1930).
As a baseline for comparison to today's environment, in the 1910s, the PTO received
approximately 71,000 new patent applications per year. Id.
38 The United States Patent ffice, supra note 26, at 787. Again, for a perspective of the
system as it stood then, in the 1930s annual patent filings were approximately 60-66,000
per year. Id. at 781.
2007-2008
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and ten-year pendency would occur by 1985, 39 a dire prediction that
turned out to be only slightly premature in its timing. The foremost reason
may be that U.S. industry did not view the situation as a serious problem
until only recently. A backlog of this magnitude may not have been widely
perceived as a problem because pendency was relatively low-e.g., in the
1920s it was approximately 5.9 months. 40 But it has steadily grown over
time, and it is now a practical problem.
One must conclude that different industries perceive pendency in
different ways, as a consequence of their respective industry business
models. In order to obtain first mover advantage, many industries place
their product or service in the stream of commerce prior to applying for a
patent and long before the patent is granted. Some industries, such as the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, must await regulatory
approval from agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration or
Environmental Protection Agency. Under the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act,41 some lost patent terms may be restored. A delay at the
PTO of even several years may not be perceived as harmful for business
purposes in such industries. In contrast, the modern software and
semiconductor industries, for example, have products with relatively short
lifecycles. As the burgeoning backlog has impacted patent pendency, with
the pendency exceeding the product's life in some cases, the problem has
become much more acute, if not critical. The 1955 Journal of the Patent
Office Society discusses an optimal backlog of 100,000 applications. 42
This Article does speculate as to whether any backlog is desirable, useful,
or optimal. A modest backlog may have traditionally served an
institutional purpose: namely, guaranteeing years of work for the hundreds
of federal employees serving as PTO examiners. But backlogs may
contribute to abusive and wasteful patent continuation practices. 43 One
can conclude that it is in the nation's best interest for patent applications to
be processed as expediently as possible, so as to guarantee that inventions
can be promptly commercialized and new technology disclosed to the
39 R.Y. Peters, Publication of Pending Applications, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 553, 561
(1966).
4' Harris, supra note 1, at 446.
41 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417.
42 The United States Patent Qffice, supra note 28, at 786. The article's conclusion that the
ideal backlog for the PTO is 100,000 applications is predicated on the assumption of a
staff of 850 patent examiners. Id. According to these assumptions, sthe article would
suggest that today's PTO, with a workforce of 5000 examiners, would have an "ideal"
backlog of approximately 588,000. In any event, the actual PTO backlog far exceeds the
literature's suggested ideal.
43 The Patent Act permits an applicant to file a continuation of a pending application. 35
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public. While there may be a fear in some quarters that a nominal backlog
may lead to reductions in the federal workforce, two points are offered to
rebut this contention. First, the employment of the PTO examination
corps should not be tied to the inventory. If the inventory were to shrink
below a certain threshold, then examiners should be given the ability to
spend additional time scrutinizing the pending applications. Second, the
current state of the PTO and its enormous inventory make this only a
theoretical concern.
In sum, the modern U.S. patent system, which has been based on a
claiming system since 1836, has had an unexamined application backlog
for almost its entire existence. Today, the PTO's seven-digit application
backlog has reached epidemic proportions. Pressure from industry and
Congress to address the backlog will influence the allocation of agency
resources for decades. The inevitable diversion of agency resources to
contend with a backlog of this magnitude poses a threat to patent quality,
e.g., an insufficient workforce must contend with a growing amount of
work over a given time interval.
At the PTO, patent workload and quality are interrelated. The
workload and the productivity of the average patent examiner vary with
her skill and grade. It is estimated that, on average, an examiner must
examine eighty-seven applications per year, spending approximately
nineteen hours on each application. 44 Some applications, due to their
complexity, require longer review. The quality of an examination relates
to the length of the review. In theory, the examination process should be
prompt and efficient, such that one could apply for a patent in the
morning, get some type of feedback from an examiner a few hours later,
and finally be granted a patent a few hours after that. Today, the reality of
the record backlog (one million unexamined applications) 45 and pendency
(up to ten years) beg the question: "Why must one wait ten years for
nineteen hours of work?" The case for the operational reform of the PTO
is very strong. The solutions to these problems - which will require
legislative amendments to the Patent Act and various resources - have
been elusive to articulate, if not achieve.
44 GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 28. Accordingly the average patent examiner is
spending approximately 1700 hours per year on examination activity. This provides a
rough estimate of the PTO's capacity to examine its pending and new workload.
45 The Author's research demonstrates that the PTO has had a significant backlog for
more than a century, surpassing 100,000 in the 1920s. The PTO's own annual reports
show a backlog of approximately 162,000 applications in 1974. See Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Annual Report Fiscal Year
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A. THE PTO CANNOT SPEND ITS WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM
The debate about the patent system, including quality concerns,
has largely focused on the PTO's resources, or lack thereof, for most of
the 1990s. Industry and the patent bar have long asserted that the workload
and quality problems at the PTO were a result of the government's failure
to provide the agency adequate funding. This blame-game chorus reached
a crescendo in 2002 when Congress was formulating the PTO's annual
budget.
Every year, Congress faces a multitude of difficult spending
choices as part of the annual budget process, e.g., health care, defense,
scientific research, and infrastructure. It does not take kindly to any
federal agency squandering its budget. In the course of writing the annual
spending bill that traditionally included the PTO (i.e., Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Bill), the then-Republican controlled House of
Representatives and the then-Democratic controlled U.S. Senate squarely
responded to critics who alleged that the PTO's problems were due to lack
of funding and necessary resources. The House Appropriators observed
the following in the report accompanying that year's appropriation bill,
H.R. 2500:
The [House] Committee [on Appropriations] remains concerned
that the Patent and Trademark Office is unable to meet the
demands of the increasing number of patent applications. The
Committee is concerned that, with the increased funding the Office
has received in the past, there is no measurable increase in
performance. Every agency must set performance measures and
strive to meet them. If these goals are not met, then the agency
must be able to answer the questions from Congress and their
customers as to why it was unable to meet its goals. The PTO and
the patent user community have continually criticized the Congress
and the Administration for not allowing full access to their fees in
the year they are received, yet PTO has been unsuccessful in
proving that increased funding will decrease the amount of time it
takes an applicant to receive a patent. PTO bases its budget
submission on anticipated fee income, which is derived from an
estimation of its anticipated workload. However, there is no
indication that the existing level of fees was developed based on
any direct relationship to the actual costs of doing business.
46
46 H.R. Rep. No. 107-139, at 66 (2002 Fiscal Year) (Departments of Commerce, Justice,
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The very same year, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations echoed
these same concerns when approving the agency's 2002 fiscal year
budget:
While the agency has experienced significant growth in the recent
years as a direct result of workload increases, PTO's corporate
plan predicts that patent pendency will rise ... to an unacceptable
38.6 months by fiscal year 2006. . . . The ability of the
administration to formulate an adequate budget for the PTO is
complicated [first due to failing to] provide the Committee with a
thorough business plan that demonstrates how resources will be
used and what results [the PTO] will obtain. Second, PTO
management has not been sufficiently innovative. Although patent
filings have increased dramatically over the past decade, PTO
management chose to remain wedded to an archaic patent process
and attempted to hire its way out of its workload problems ...
Further, substantial amounts of funds have been expended on
information technology projects over the last decade, but no
significant increase in examiner productivity has been noted.
Finally, the Committee [on Appropriations] lacks full confidence
in the information provided to it by PTO management regarding its
needs and performance.
47
It is a truism in Washington, D.C. that when both the Republicans
and Democrats agree that you have a problem, in fact you really do. This
rare exercise in a public bipartisan scolding of a federal agency and its
management, a task well within the prerogative of the Committee on
Appropriations and its oversight function, highlights many lessons. One
lesson is that the PTO cannot simply spend its way out of its problems.
The second lesson is that any solution to the PTO's long-standing
workload and quality problems demands a departure from its current
business model and examination process. Simply put, if the PTO is to be
an agency for innovation, it also must become an agency that is innovative
in its mission.
B. SECRETARY ROGAN'S QUEST FORA 21 ST CENTURY PTO
The PTO's basic role, or in other words its business model, has
remained the same for approximately 200 years. 48 The nation, technology,
and the world have changed enormously since the PTO was created.
Today, users of the patent system pursue a much more complex task.
47 S. Rep. No. 107-42, at 84-85 (2001) (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2002).
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Today's inventions often are of vast complexity, sometimes with
commercial embodiments of products and processes that often require
dozens, if not hundreds, of inventions. In addition, inventors often need to
obtain patents in multiple foreign jurisdictions. Users of the system face
heightened workload, pendency and quality issues, and a far more
complicated, if not bureaucratic, set of substantive and procedural rules
surrounding examination. Notwithstanding the fact that PTO officials and
system users have engaged in an elusive quest to modernize the patent
system for the twenty-first century, the current system still resembles the
system of the eighteenth century.
During the Author's tenure on Capitol Hill as a legislative staffer,
he was told that the mission of each under secretary and director of the
PTO is the same: choose a problem to attack, develop and launch a series
of initiatives, and then declare victory and leave the Office for the private
sector. Earlier this decade, then-Under Secretary of Commerce and
Director of the USPTO, James E. Rogan, made great strides in formulating
a vision of reforming the PTO and implementing his plan. As a former
U.S. Congressman, Rogan was expected to prevail upon his former
congressional colleagues to enact his reform agenda. Rogan undertook the
noble and elusive quest of reforming the PTO (and succeeded in large
part) (In contrast to other PTO directors, after his tenure, Rogan returned
to public service as a California state judge).
Rogan testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee
regarding the Office's operations:
The 21" t Century Strategic Plan is built on the premise that
American innovators need to obtain enforceable intellectual
property rights here and abroad as seamlessly and cost-effectively
as possible. It provides a roadmap for creating an agile
organization worthy of the leadership role American intellectual
property plays in the global economy.49
Likewise, at the 2003 hearing, Rogan echoed his previous testimony
before the Judiciary Subcommittee regarding the state of the PTO. In
2002, he testified:
The increasing volume and complexity of our workload poses
serious issues for the USPTO. Some might even use the word
"crisis." Let me give one historical representation of how serious
these challenges are. I mentioned that the patent system faced
significant problems in the 1980s - this situation was highlight in a
49 United States Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003: Hearing on HRk
1561 Before the H Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, H
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 23 (2003) (prepared statement of the Hon. James E.
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1981 U.S. News & World Report article entitled "Patent System a
Drag on Innovation." What has led to such a dramatic
pronouncement? In 1980, average patent pendency was 22.6
months. In FY 2001 it was 24.7 months, and absent a new course,
it is projected to grow beyond three tears. In 1980, the backlog of
applications was about 81,000. By the time I was sworn in a few
months ago, the backlog of applications stood at more than
330,000. I believe the challenges the USPTO faces today, while
similar to the situations in the mid-i 960s and early 1980s, are on a
much larger scale.50
Rogan's congressional testimony included the dire prediction that
the PTO would face an application backlog exceeding one million
applications within five years if Congress did not pass legislation to enact
the Strategic Plan. In addition to Under Secretary Rogan, Congress also
heard from a myriad of other voices, including the patent bar, the high
tech industry, and the PTO employees' union. 51 Congress rejected the
implementing legislation that the Administration - of the same political
party - submitted. Instead, Congress enacted a scaled down version of the
proposed legislation that essentially established a twenty-percent increase
to the PTO user fee schedule, i.e., the fees that an applicant is required to
pay for the examination of a patent application and the related
maintenance fees. The additional resources primarily would go to hire
additional patent examiners and develop the agency's electronic
infrastructure ("e-government") initiatives. A few years later, Under
Secretary and Director Rogan's cautionary predictions about a one-million
patent application backlog and soaring patent pendency would become
reality.
In brief summary, Rogan's leadership and hard work lead to
successfully persuading Congress to enact a limited, modified version of
51 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Operations and Fiscal Year 2003 Budget: Before
the H. Judic. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 7
(2002) (prepared statement of the Hon. James E. Rogan, Under Secretary of Commerce
and Director of the USPTO). Likewise, in 1963 U.S. News & World Report featured an
article entitled Invention Is it Keeping Up? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 70, July 15,
1963. David Lowell Ladd, the former Commissioner of Patents under President Kennedy,
explained that "[there is a] real crisis at the Patent Office... [and] the crisis is here now."
See also Peters, supra note 39, at 558 n.6 ("The Commissioner pointed out that there is a
'real crisis at the Patent Office' and 'the crisis is here now.").
51 The hearing witnesses included Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA); John K. Williamson, President,
Intellectual Property Owners (IPO) (IPO is a trade association consisting of
approximately 100 Fortune 500 companies); Colleen Kelley, National Treasury
Employees Union (NTEU represents one of the PTO's employee unions); and the hearing
record contained letters from groups such as National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM represents approximately 14,000 member companies). U.S. Patent and
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his PTO modernization legislation. Congress, however, rejected the
proposed statutory provision permitting the PTO to obtain a search of the
52relevant prior art results from private entities, as opposed to the federal
examining corps. The original provision was opposed by the PTO's
unions, many lawmakers on both the Republican and Democrat sides of
the aisle, the patent bar, and industry. The reasons for opposition to the
provision, though varied, should be obvious on their face. The PTO's
unions were concerned, as is much of the U.S. workforce today, about the
risk of good white-collar jobs being outsourced. Conservative lawmakers
were concerned that national security could be jeopardized by foreign
search companies reviewing patent applications and conducting prior art
searches. The patent bar feared that the uncertainty and cost of patent
prosecution would increase, as escalating PTO fees would eat into the
budget for patent attorneys preparing patent applications. Instead of the
proposed legislation, Congress enacted a very limited one-year pilot
project for testing the proposal. The pilot project was never pursued by the
PTO due to the agency's inability to comply with the limitations
established by Congress.
The Rogan bill's principal benefit was that it modestly raised PTO
application fees to generate additional revenues for the agency
(approximately $200 million in the first year alone). A majority of this
revenue has been invested in hiring additional patent examiners (e.g.,
approximately 1000 new examiners per year). Yet, the state of the PTO
today is still dismal at best. It remains a bloated bureaucracy and is getting
larger every year.53 In 2005, the GAO explained, "USPTO officials
acknowledge they have had difficulty competing with the private sector to
attract and retain staff with the high degree of scientific, technical, and
legal knowledge to be patent examiners. ' , 54 It is estimated that it requires
between four and six years of on-the-job training before a patent examiner
is fully proficient at her task.55 Yet the attrition rate of examiners hovers
around nine percent for the corps overall, and it is estimated to run as high
as fifty percent for new hires within their first two years of service at the
56
agency.
52 See supra note 29.
53 The PTO's annual report to Congress explains that at the end of the 2006 fiscal year,
the agency had 8189 federal employees, including 4779 patent examiners and 3817
contract employees. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, USPTO's FY 2006 Financial
Statements, Audit Rep. No. FSD-18003- 7-0002 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/rannual/2006/index.html.
54 GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 1.
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C. LESSONS LEARNED
An essential insight of this Article is that patent reform, as is true
with any legal reform in the U.S. legislative system, cannot occur without
the support of certain political constituencies. In economic terms,
constituencies can impose constraints on the system or the model. The
patent system is largely a creature of Congress. In my experience over the
past decade, the key political constituencies in the patent reform arena
include:
The Patent Bar Associations. The attorneys and other users of the
patent system, such as the American Intellectual Property Law
Association ("AIPLA"), which represents 14,000 U.S. intellectual
property lawyers. The patent bar associations have historically
demonstrated the ability to work successfully with the PTO and
Congress on patent law reform.
High-Technology Industries. As users of the patent system, high-
tech industries, including the manufacturing, telecommunications,
software, semiconductor, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
industries, have a strong interest in a healthy U.S. patent system
and in enhancing patent quality. This is evidenced by the fact that
many players in these industries are willing to pay higher patent
fees if it ensures enhanced patent quality. It is in the interest of
industry to have a well-vetted patent to pursue in the stream of
commerce. Likewise, industry objects to frivolous litigation from
aggressive patent plaintiffs that assert poor quality patents.
PTO Unions. The PTO has three unions representing its federal
employees, including patent and trademark examiners and its
other personnel. The largest of the three is the Patent Office
Professional Association ("POPA"). POPA has demonstrated
ability to influence both Republican and Democrat members of
Congress. Its representatives have frequently testified on PTO
reform. POPA's two primary goals are essentially to obtain higher
pay and more examining time per application for its personnel.
Congressional Panels. Congress is known for its process and
jurisdictional issues. In the debate over PTO resources, clashes
developed between the authorizing and appropriations committees
in each chamber. Accordingly the proposals to provide the PTO
with more resources by taking "off-budget" or other such statutory
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An important and overlooked reality is the nature and processes of
the institutions involved in the debate. The U.S. Senate is known as the
world's greatest deliberative body. In advocating any legislative reform,
any proponent must meet a very high bar in the U.S. system. It is naYve to
think that an intellectual property legislative proposal can pass with the
support of fifty-one Senators, or even the sixty Senators necessary for
cloture, to overcome a filibuster. The reality of the modern era is that the
Senate is a busy institution, and that the authorizing committee of primary
jurisdiction, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, is particularly busy
with issues including judicial nominations, immigration, civil liberties,
national security, and Department of Justice oversight on its agenda.
Moreover, the Senate is renowned for the process whereby a single
Senator can place a "hold" and stop a bill from floor consideration. As a
result, any intellectual property legislative proposal must have the support
of a virtually unanimous Senate for it to advance to the President's desk
for signature and enactment into law. Any serious effort to enhance patent
quality must be keenly cognizant of such political realities.
III. GAME THEORY AS A TOOL TO ENHANCE PATENT SYSTEM
QUALITY AND OPERATIONS
Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that provides a tool
for analyzing the behavior of a person or a system and for developing
strategies. 57 It is a tool that permits one, inter alia, to optimally resolve a
conflict or to make a decision based on one's knowledge of a situation, the
choice of outcomes among alternatives, and the desirable amount of risk.
It enables one to form a strategy regarding what choices to make, "or,
better, the choices one should make.",5 8 When you think carefully before
you act - when you are aware of your objectives or preferences and of any
limitations or constraints on your actions and choose your actions in a
calculated way to do the best according to your own criteria-you are said
to be behaving rationally. Game theory adds another dimension to rational
behavior-namely, interaction with other equally rational decision
makers. In other words, game theory is the science of rational behavior in
interactive situations.59
Accordingly, it makes sense that game theory should be explored
as a method to help enhance the patent system. This is true because the
patent system, like so many other systems, is compromised of multiple
participants with limited knowledge who try to maximize certain results.
This is the case regardless of whether one considers the PTO or its related
57 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994).
58 LUCE, supra note 4, at 4.
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players as rational or irrational. Regardless of a given applicant's
motivation, the system should work efficiently to serve the needs of the
entire public through the timely and thorough disposition of applications.
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
For the purposes of this Article, game theory and applied
economics may be a useful tool to address the agency's problems, if not
enhance its overall operations. Three historical trends frame the realities
surrounding the U.S. patent system: (1) the century-plus trend of yearly
increases in patent application filings, now of such high-volume that it is
arguably beyond the capacity of the PTO (e.g., now at least 400,000
annually); (2) the highly labor intensive nature of the examination process;
and (3) the small number of patents that appear to have value for their
owners in litigated patent cases (e.g., today about 2000-3000 annually).60
(In this context, the term "value" refers to the foreseeable economic power
or industrial importance.)
These trends have a historical basis and long pedigree. A
generation ago, the former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, Howard T. Markey, observed: "Between 1953 and
1971 over 1,000,000 patents were issued. Only 1080 were litigated or
0.1%.4'61 Litigation is not the sole measure of a patent's worth, of course,
as shall be discussed in more detail. Yet the data inevitably indicates that
all patents do not have identical value, at least in terms of importance or
worth, when viewed in the context of litigation. A vast majority of patents
are never licensed or litigated. As such, litigation may be a proxy for an
economically valuable or otherwise socially important patent. Because
most patents are never litigated, Congress, PTO officials, industry and
academics face a question: how best to allocate the PTO's finite and
clearly overtaxed examination resources.
To solve this problem, the PTO should examine patent applications
in accordance with their foreseeable importance. In his seminal paper,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Professor Mark A. Lemley
answers the elusive question, "How much time should the PTO spend on
examining patent applications?" as follows: "To judge by recent criticism
of the office from academics, industry leaders, and the press, the answer is
'a lot more than it does now."' 62 Professor Lemley, among many other
60 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication qf Patent Cases: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 35 (2005) (prepared statement of Chris J. Katopis).
61 Howard T. Markey, The Status of the Patent System "Sans Myth, Sans Fiction", 59
J.P.O.S. 164 (1977). In contrast, approximately one million patents have been issued in
the past six years (2007-2001). Further, one can estimate that 18,000 of these patents
were litigated, based on general litigation rates. Hence, a rate of 1.8 percent.
2007-2008
22
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critics, argues that increased examination time would help weed out some
of the bad patents that plague the system. While there is universal
agreement that additional examination time would enhance patent quality,
allocation of additional time is subject to practical constraints. The closest
proxy for a patent application's "importance" may simply be its economic
value. In a recent paper, Patent Portfolios, Professors Parchomovsky and
Wagner describe a "patent paradox": "It is abundantly clear that firms act
as though patents are important ... [f]iling patterns and firms' attitudes
toward patents have presented theorists with a puzzle: if patents are
valuable, where does their value lie?,
63
The true value of a patent is elusive to academics and other critical
observers, regardless of whether one relies on empirical or theoretical
analysis. A market mechanism does not exist to assign value to individual
patents.64 Patents must have value-otherwise the past 200 years of
patenting-seeking activity and resulting seven million-plus issued U.S.
patents has been an exercise in irrationality. The highest government
officials testify to the critical importance of the patent system to the
Nation's economy. 65 As Patent Portfolios concludes: "Given that virtually
all the corporations that engage in intensive patenting operate in highly
competitive industries, and that many of them are Fortune 500 companies,
it is highly unlikely that such irrational behavior could persist for so many
years without grave economic consequences . . . this is not borne out by
reality." 66 The authors further theorize that beyond reaping huge damage
awards through litigation, the value of patents can be found across the
following categories:
(1) as providing information in terms of credible signals about a
patented invention and the firm;
67
(2) as internal metrics of an entity's performance, innovation, R&D or
an individual employee's productivity;
(3) as a sort of lottery ticket, wherein a low relative cost buys one the
possibility of a large payoff,
62 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495,
1495 (2001) [hereinafter Rational Ignorance].
63 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5
(2005).
64 The firm Ocean Tomo is pioneering new financial opportunities in creating markets for
patents. It describes itself as the leading "Intellectual Capital Merchant Banc® firm."
See Ocean Tomo, http://www.oceantomo.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
65 See Pauline Newman, The Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11
FED. CIR. B.J. 541 (2002).
66 Parchomovsky & Wagner, Patent Portfolios, supra note 63, at 18.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360 (2008)
(4) as providing a firm a defensive tool against patent infringement
suits;
(5) as increasing a firm's voice in the politics of the patent system;
and,
(6) as enhancing the ability of a firm to attract and retain capital.68
The subsidiary question is whether the current PTO examination
model makes sense in light of these trends and modern criticism. Roughly
speaking, the PTO charges the same examination fee 69 and devotes the
same amount of examination resources to every application. For the nearly
past decade, the PTO has attempted, and failed, to become "efficient,"
although this may be an inapt term. One cannot say that the PTO was
really trying to become more efficient, as it realized that only so much
could be done with a given unit of an employee's time. Computerization
would only aid the situation to a limited degree. Instead the PTO tried to
become more productive by attempting to "devolve" the applications
process, so that the examiner did not have as large as a job per application
in the course of the examination routine. As part of its original "21st
Century Strategic Plan,, 70 the PTO proposed outsourcing the search
portion of the examination. This proposal was based on two rationales: (1)
the private sector could accomplish the search function more efficiently
than the government; and (2) the other major world patent offices (e.g., the
Japan Patent Office and the European Patent Offices) could share the
search results for co-pending applications. 71 In response to the concerns
expressed by PTO union members, Congress did not permit this proposal
to advance in a way that could be meaningfully implemented.
The PTO's current view concerning the reform of the examination
process is that it requires a "shared burden" by applicants. For example,
the PTO advocates a legislative proposal requiring applicants to provide a
patentability report (i.e., Applicant Quality Submission, or "AQS").72 In
68 Id. at 20-38.
69 To be precise, certain small entities and non-profits are charged a 50% discount on
some patent filing fees, 35 U.S.C. § 4 1(d) (2002).
71 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN (2003),
available athttp://wwwl.uspto.gov/go/com/strat2l/stratplan 03feb2003.pdf.
71 It is estimated that ten million patent applications are co-pending around the world.
"The current world backlog stands at over 10 million unexamined patents. However there
is a lot of redundancy within the current system and it needs to be addressed. ... ."
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 36 (2007) (quoting Jon W.
Dudas), available at http://www.epo.org/topics/patent-system/scenarios-for-the-
future.html.
72 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908 at § 12; Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145,
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2007, the PTO promulgated a flurry of new rules aimed at changing the
balance in the long-standing examination model, e.g., limiting the number
of continuations and claims and requiring applicants to submit a search
report as part of the application.
In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Professor Lemley
argues that this is the central problem facing the PTO: "How much time
and money should the Patent and Trademark Office spend deciding
whether to issue a patent? ' 73 His paper concluded that the PTO is
"rationally ignorant" because the examination of patents is too costly. 74 It
seems likely that the patent system would be more efficient and patent
quality enhanced if certain patent applications were more rigorously
scrutinized than others. This would entail a shift in agency resources and
would impact the workload of the agency.
The inquiry, then, is defining the appropriate reform of the current
examination process. More specifically, the question is what new
processes might be implemented to improve the system that can balance
workload and quality issues. Professor Lemley reminds us that that any
enhanced examination system has its own problems; inter alia, "[it] will
necessarily increase the delay in issuing patents, and therefore the
uncertainty associated with the ownership of legal rights in an
invention., 75 Another concern is that increasing the scrutiny of some
applications may be perceived as a form of harassment or otherwise unfair
treatment.
B. THE TRIAGE OF VALUABLE PATENTS
In the seminal article Valuable Patents, John Allison, Mark
Lemley, Kimberly Moore, and R. Derek Trunkey combined empirical data
analysis with patent research and analysis of the patent system, concluding
that "the patent system should pay more attention to the small subset of
patents that have proved themselves valuable. ' ' 76 This Article agrees that
the patent system could be vastly improved by having a more rigorous
examination of certain patents (the important or otherwise valuable
inventions), requiring that a smaller, limited set of applications be
reviewed. The difficulty in implementing a varying standard of
73 Lemley, supra note 62, at 1495.
74 Id. "The basic idea of rational ignorance is that any person will spend only a certain
amount of time or money to obtain a piece of information. If obtaining that information
costs more than the information is worth, an individual will (or should) rationally choose
to remain ignorant of it." Id. at 1497 n.6.
75 Id. at 1521.
76 John R. Allison et. al.,. Valuable Patents, 92 GEORGETOWN L.J. 435, 437 (2004). "We
conclude that the easiest way to discover the characteristics of valuable patents is to study
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examination scrutiny is the challenge of selecting which applications are
significant either because they are valuable economically, industrially
significant, or important societally. Such applications demand greater
examination resources. The patent system thus requires a filter, or triage
mechanism, to determine the appropriate set of applications to review.
This Article will now turn to the various methodologies that the literature
has set forth regarding how this determination should be made.
In Valuable Patents, the authors reach two conclusions: (1) certain
valuable patents can be identified retrospectively; and (2) predictions can
be made concerning which of the "valuable patents" are likely to be
litigated.77 The authors in essence employ a game theory approach to
assess which granted patents are actually valuable. They conclude that the
easiest way to discern the characteristics of valuable patents is to study
patents that have already been litigated and to thereby develop a model for
ascertaining valuable patents. 78 Even though the relative ease of this
method is appealing, the litigation factor has recently been challenged by
other academic researchers.
Valuable Patents also suggests the following: it is incontrovertible
that all patented inventions do not share the same destiny: some will be
litigated or licensed, some merely will be held as trophies, and some will
never be used and will sit in the proverbial dusty attic. Because only a
minority of patents will be either litigated or licensed, the equal treatment
of all applications seems highly inefficient. The PTO should be able to
discriminate among incoming patent applications and devote examination
resources as optimally necessary.
Yet, upon closer review, the Valuable Patents reasoning has flaws.
For example, the analysis concludes that a patent's value is a function of
its propensity to be litigated. Thus, a key factor in the patent value (or
worth) analysis for Allison et al. is estimating the probability that a patent
is litigated.79 Professor Allison, along with Professor Sager, recently
elaborated upon his proposal:
[Valuable Patents] did not, in fact, advocate triage classification...
[t]he only relevant metrics the PTO could use for this purpose
would be number of claims and prior art references .... [Valuable
Patents] suggested, instead, that the number of claims and prior art
references could serve as part of a complexity index that might
77 Id. at 437-38.
7 1 Id. at 437.
79 See John R. Allison & Thomas W. Sager, Valuable Patents Redux." On the Enduring
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assist the PTO in sorting applications for the purpose of more
optimal allocation of examiner time to applications.
80
Professors David Adelman and Kathryn DeAngelis recently
concluded that Allison et al. "do not disclose whether more time is
actually spent on certain classes of patents," and that this failure results in
an "empirical haze." 81 Adelman and DeAngelis submit that the Valuable
Patents analysis is flawed because Allison et al.
gloss over several significant limitations of their findings .... For
example, [Allison et al.] investigate average patent prosecution
times for the fourteen technology fields defined in their study and
from these results claim that the 'patent prosecution system...
spends much more time and attention of some sorts of patents than
others.'
82
The Adelman-DeAngelis article presents the following parameters
for identifying valuable patents. In developing an algorithm or any
heuristic for a new examination paradigm, these parameters may be of use
according to its authors:
(1) the distribution of the valuable patents is highly skewed, with
most of having little or no value and only a relatively small portion having
any value at all;
83
(2) the distributions of the several patent characteristics (called
patent metrics) often viewed as indicators of value are skewed, thus
rendering them unreliable as relevant value metrics;
84
(3) Valuable Patents' findings of statistically significant
differences in the characteristics of litigated and unlitigated patents that
does not mean that the differences are of a practically significant
magnitude; 85 and
(4) the "base-rate" problem, which may occur when attempting to
predictively identify a small subset of a population, prevents Valuable
Patents' result from having any predictive power.86
80Id. at 1788.
81 David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1677, 1714-15 (2007).
82 Id. at 1714 (footnote omitted).
83 Id. at 1707-08.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1724.
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One can theorize that a more efficient PTO would perform some
triage or filtering of incoming applications. In theory, this could be
achieved by a random selection of incoming applications (which is clearly
unfair and arbitrary) or some filtering based on predetermined criteria
(e.g., foreseeable value). A choice based on value would overcome the
inherent disadvantages of a randomly based selection, but the dilemma is
how to ascertain that foreseeable value. Two schools of thought have
emerged concerning how best to predict the value of patents. In the first
camp, Allison and Lemley focus on a number of criteria that can predict
the patent's probability of being litigated. For Allison and Lemley, this is a
sufficient proxy for a valuable patent. The Allison and Lemley camp
appears to ignore the other useful purposes underlying a patent's
importance previously discussed (e.g., signaling, defensive portfolios,
etc.). In the second camp are the Kierkegaards, or the nihilist economists
who believe that the data surrounding patent filings do not enable any
appropriate predictions regarding a patent's value. It is well-known that
economists and statisticians often disagree about how to measure or
otherwise evaluate the world. As will be shown next, it is fortunate that
one need rely neither on economists nor the development of a predictive
heuristic to ascertain valuable patents - regardless of whether their value
lies in litigation, serving as a trophy - and weeding out the poor patents by
discouraging applications of dubious quality. This Article proposes that
patent applicants can rely on a market mechanism to determine value,
whether or not that value is economic.
C. THE PATENT SYSTEM AS A LOTTERY
In many ways, the patent system functions as a lottery. Economist
F.M. Scherer is credited with the lottery analogy, which compares a patent
application to a lottery ticket with a low entrance cost and a very small
chance of a very large payoff. 8 7 Critics of the current patent regime assess
the potential value of a patent using the damages predicted upon
successful infringement litigation. Allison and Sager write: "We have
good predictors to identify [those patents] . . . other patents [] are like
lottery tickets. Some of those, though fewer, are litigated."88
Economics and game theory are useful tools with which to judge
the propriety of such a rationale. Nobel Laureate and Columbia University
Professor William Vickrey explains:
17 F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); see also Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of
Patent Mortality Rates. Using Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent
Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 n.30 (2002) ("A patent is not unlike an expensive lottery
ticket; you pay your money up front and hope for a big payoff.").
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The purchase of tickets in lotteries, sweepstakes, and
"numbers" pools would imply, on such a basis, that the
marginal utility of money is an increasing rather than a
decreasing function of income. Such a conclusion is obviously
unacceptable as a guide to social policy. A small fraction of
such gambling can be attributed to the presence of an
eleemosynary element. But for the bulk of such gambling the
explanation must be sought elsewhere. One explanation that is
consistent with maintaining the assumption of rationality in
other dealings would be that the purchase of lottery tickets
represents the purchase of a right to hope, however forlornly, in
a situation otherwise intolerably barren of this psychological
necessity. Other forms of gambling can perhaps be ascribed to
the persistence of an egoistic delusion that one's own skill or
judgment is better than the opponent's, or to utilities derived in
the process rather than from the end result. 89
IV. PROPOSAL: A HYBRID EXAMINATION MECHANISM
"It is difficult to predict, especially about the future."
--Danish Physicist Niels Bohr
90
The goal of the following proposal is to define a mechanism that
will improve the patent system's examination capabilities and enhance
patent quality. The proposal relies on reforming PTO operations by
permitting a more focused examination of some patent applications. The
PTO's current fundamental "business model," viz., examination of patent
applications, is the same today as it was in the nineteenth century. As the
PTO increasingly struggles to face the challenges and the realities of the
twenty-first century, it continues to fail, if not severely lag behind in its
mission. The failure is increasingly evident in the poor quality of its
examination and the backlog crisis. Any solution must permit the PTO to
devote more resources for a more rigorous examination of a fewer number
of applications. This requires a prioritization to filter and triage the
incoming applications.
This Article described how the last major legislative change of the
patent system faced fierce political opposition from a variety of quarters.
91
'9 William Vickrey, Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk, in PUBLIC
ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS BY WILLIAM VICKREY 15, 23-24 (Richard Arnott et al.
eds., 1994).
9' See THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 92 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006); see also,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiiNeils Bohr ("It is very difficult to make an accurate
prediction, especially about the future.").
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In light of these political guideposts, it is clear that any proposal for PTO
operational reform must satisfy these constituencies:
(1) PTO unions' concerns about how time and workload impact the
examiner's mission;
(2) industry's concerns about patent quality; and,
(3) general concerns about receiving patent protection for an
invention that is unlikely to ever be litigated or licensed.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a hybrid, multi-tiered patent
system in which an applicant is guaranteed legal rights for her invention
(e.g., either through the grant of limited exclusivity for her invention after
a very restricted examination) or the traditional panoply of exclusive rights
after a more robust PTO examination than is the current practice. In fact,
today many nations already grant inventors what is known as a "petty
patent." A "petty patent" refers to a grant of legal protection providing
limited exclusive rights and perhaps a shorter duration of protection for an
invention than the current patent grant.
92
At the heart of this reform proposal, I suggest that the PTO's quest
for rationality may be achieved through a widely accepted practice. The
PTO should alter its current examination policy and operations to function
as other organizations do in the course of allocating a scarce resource-the
patent examiner's time. The PTO should thus engage in a type of
filtering, if not application triage.93 Other key governmental agencies
allocate their resources through the means of an auction (e.g., the Federal
Communications Commission auctions off radio spectrum, the Federal
92 The United States has considered the implementation of a petty patent for decades,
though the proposal has not been endorsed by Congress. A registration system for
inventions was considered as part of the Carter Administration reforms that lead to the
establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the patent
reexamination system. Final Report of the Advisory Committee in Industrial Innovation
162 (1979). See also Lee A. Hollaar, A New Look at Patent Reform, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 743 (2005) (arguing for a new lower-cost, intermediate and
limited form of patent protection); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (1999) (explaining how more than sixty nations now provide some
alternative legal mechanism for the protection of inventions).
93 See e.g., Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 1 (2007) (arguing the efficiency of radio spectrum allocation by
economically efficient means); Michael J. Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Municipalziation:
Opportunism and Bypass in Electric Power, 18 ENERGY L.J. 333, 355 (1997) (arguing
that innovation in electricity pricing structures (e.g., peak and off-peak pricing) will
promote energy efficiency, responsiveness, and reliability in energy markets); Daniel R.
Polsby, Airport Pricing ofAircraft Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Economic Critique qf
Federal Regulatory Policy, 89 CAL. L. REv. 779 (2001) (proposing a new pricing
structure for air travel to maximize the use of airport resources and minimize congestion);
Christopher S. You, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J.
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Aviation Administration has airports allocate flights through the use of
slotting, etc.). 94 Even at the local level, lawmakers such as New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg have proposed congestion pricing in an effort
to promote efficient transportation patterns and fight climate change and
air pollution.
95
Because the current PTO examination system permits the filing of
an unlimited number of applications upon payment of a statutory fee, it
has led to a number of long-standing problems (e.g., poor patent quality, a
crisis-level workload, abusive continuations, etc.) that for the most part are
now considered to be the norm. In contrast, the establishment of a finite
ceiling on the number of patent applications that the PTO can examine in a
given year, combined with some type of alternate patent rights system
(e.g., a registration or a petty patent system), would provide several
important advantages. Such a system would spur competition among
applicants, encouraging them to pursue only truly valuable patents and
weeding out the otherwise inferior or "poor quality" or "defective" patents
and claims. It would thus resolve many of the problems plaguing the
current system. In particular, a mechanism that limits the number of
applications for full patents permits the PTO to better focus its resources,
thereby alleviating the long-standing workload problems of backlog and
pendency, and enhancing the overall quality of patents granted.
Consider the following hypotheticals. As previously explained, the
PTO has suffered with a backlog for nearly a century because it receives
more work than it can adequately process in a given fiscal year. Since we
know from the recent 2005 GAO Report that the average PTO examiner
reviews eighty-seven applications each year and that there are currently
about 5000 examiners, the agency should be able to review 435,000
applications annually. If the PTO only allocates a number of "slots" (i.e.,
opportunities for an application's examination) equal to half of the number
of patents it examines each year (i.e., 217,500), then its current corps of
examiners could increase the time they spend examining patents by a
factor of two (e.g., 38 hours per case on average). If the PTO further cut
94 In aviation, "slots" refer to the flight caps at airports pursuant to the "High Density
Rule," 37 Fed. Reg. 25, 508 (1982). In 1969, slotting was instituted at four of the
nation's busiest airports (O'Hare, JFK, LaGuardia, and Washington Reagan-National). In
1995, the Department of Transportation issued a report to Congress which predicted that
if airport flight caps were removed, widespread delay and congestion would result. U.S.
Dep't of Transp., Report to the Congress. A Study of the High Density Rule (1995). After
Congress repealed the caps in 2000, the prediction regarding these delays came true.
95 Anahad O'Connor & Danny Hakim, Bloomberg Lashes Out at Lawmakers, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 17, 2007 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg: "I heard a lot of talk about the politics
of congestion pricing and all I kept thinking about was some people have guts, and some
don't."). The New York state legislature ultimately rejected the Mayor's plan. Id.; see
also Nicholas Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee For Manhattan Gets Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2008, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, Slow Going for N.Y Traffic Plan, WASH. POST,
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the allocated examination slots to one-third or one-quarter of what is
presently available, then the examiners could further increase the number
of hours spent per case and also increase their facility to process the
enormous backlog. In practice, the PTO could hold periodic examination
slot auctions throughout the course of the year, perhaps as many as one per
week or even one per business day. The more frequent the opportunities to
obtain an application filing date, the less severe the negative effects of
missing a particular priority date. Under the United States' long-standing
"first-to-invent" system, this is a lesser concern than the alternative of a
"first-to-file" regime. 96 As auctions become more consistent, the bidding
pressure will be relieved. In game theory jargon, the outcome of this
upward bidding pressure is known as the "winner's curse." It refers to the
tendency of a winner to bid more for a prize than the prize is actually
worth. This tendency often results when bidders have incomplete
information about the prize and about other bidding competitors'
expectations, and when there are too many bidders. Likewise, the more
frequently a good or commodity is subject to trading, the more the market
forces best approximate its true value. Accordingly, the price or user fee
for examination must bear a relation to the expected value of an issued
patent.
A. AUCTIONS AND BIDDING GAMES
Game theory is a useful tool to enhance the operations and
processes of individuals and organizations in a variety of contexts,
including public institutions. Its value lies in improving decision-making
by assessing the consequences of actions by evaluating information and
risk. The best known illustration of a game theory application is the
Prisoner's Dilemma.98 In that example, two criminal suspects are
apprehended by the police. The police detain and question them
separately. Each faces the potential of a long or short prison sentence,
depending on whether or not the other suspect confesses. It is assumed
that each will have no knowledge of what the other will say. Accordingly,
each has to engage in a calculus of the best strategy in light of limited
information. The choices can be represented by the following matrix:
96 This policy relates to the concern that the price for an auction slot would be inflated by
a "rush to the PTO" and pressure to file. The United States is alone in the world in having
a patent system that recognizes the date of the invention's creation for priority rather than
its application filing date. See 35 U.S.C.§ 102 (2006). While this system has been in place
for more than two hundred years, a strong desire exists to adopt a "first-to-file" system
for harmonization purposes. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong.
(2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
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Prisoner 2:
Not Confess Confess
Not 1 year prison sentence each 10 year prison sentence
Prisoner Confess for Prisoner 1 and 3
months for Prisoner 2Confess 3 month prison sentence for 8 year prison sentence for
Prisoner 1 and 10 years for each
Prisoner 2
The dilemma for the suspects is choosing the most appropriate
course of action: whether or not to confess to the crime. 99 The
consequences range from a light charge to having "the book thrown at
them." Ideally, one individual's best course of action depends on
cooperating with the other. The rub is that the nature of the situation, here
imposed by the district attorney, precludes cooperation. This game is well-
known, in part because it is relatively simple: two players, two sets of
choices, and a relatively simple set of results. Game theory has a variety of
applications today, including economics, parlor games (e.g., chess),
military simulations, 100 and law and public policy. 101
Game theory has generated a prolific amount of analytical research
and theories regarding the processes behind auctions and bidding games.
This research attempts to explain the best competitive strategies for sellers
and buyers, as well as how to allocate goods efficiently. These
mechanisms are considered "games" in the economic sense because, inter
alia, they represent a competition among bidders who seek to maximize
their gain while relying on varying amounts of information and
expectations (e.g., the true value of the prize, the bids of their
competitors). Accordingly, auctions may be designed in a number of
99 Id.
100 Id. at 6.
101 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Viet D. Dihl, Codetermination and Corporate
Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975 (1999); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696 (1986); F. Scott Kieff&
Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the
Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REv. 111 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L.R. 1314, 1325 (2002) ("[1]t might be the case that no
practicing lawyer ever reads articles applying game theory to bankruptcy law but that
treatise writers and other doctrinal bankruptcy scholars read them and incorporated their
insights into their own, practitioner-friendly works."); Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S.
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ways. The maximization of sale revenue may be one goal, but may be
secondary to the quick disposition of goods or public policy. Likewise, the
auction may be designed in a number of ways that permit the bidders to
have varying degrees of information. Bids may be announced to a number
of people seated in the same room or submitted sealed and in writing. The
design of the auction - the game's rules - will determine the conditions of
bidding and the resulting efficiency of the outcome.
Auctions are regularly used by private entities and the government
to sell goods and services ranging from treasury bonds, radio spectrum,
initial public offerings of equities, Internet keyword advertising, antiques,
flower bulbs, to PezTM candy dispensers. For brevity's sake, here are some
of the best known species of auctions:
Simple Auction. (a.k.a. English Auction and Single-out-cry
Auction). This is probably the best known type of auction
(especially to addicts of the online auction site, eBay). In this
scenario, the simplest example of an auction is a single unique
indivisible object (e.g., an antique or painting or tulip bulb) offered
for sale to a number of potential buyers. 102 The bidding is generally
progressive-in other words, the bids are continuously made in
increasing value amounts, announced, and repeated until no
potential purchaser bids further. 103 Depending on the
communication among the bidders and the information exchanges
(e.g., the amount of the bids, the value of the object), the revenue
generated can either be much higher or lower than the true value of
the object for sale. This problem can be prevented by the
establishment of a minimum reserve price.
Dutch Auction. The Dutch Auction is regarded as very economical
in terms of both time and effort. 104 As with most popularly known
auctions, the winner is the bidder who makes the highest bid.
However, this type is a regressive game, since here the auctioneer
starts off by announcing a high price (perhaps an astronomically
high price). The auctioneer then announces successfully lower
prices in sequence until some buyer accepts. The remaining
potential buyers receive nothing. 10 5 This type of auction is useful
102 William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Sealed Tenders in Public
Economics, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS BY WILLIAM VICKREY 55, 60
(Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994).
103 Id. Vickrey concludes that the results of such auctions are Pareto-optimal. Id. at 61.
104 Id. at 62. The Dutch auction takes its name from the fact that it is sued in the
wholesale flower marketing industry in the Netherlands. Id. In the Netherlands, it is
apparently known as a "Chinese auction."
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when a seller desires to sell goods quickly because it results in a
single bid. Economists contest whether it maximizes the sale price
of the goods. Today it is used in a variety of practical contexts,
including by the U.S. Treasury Department, and through the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which uses this type of
auction to sell financial instruments.
Tullock Auction (Tullock Lottery). In this type of auction,
everyone who submits a bid, including the losers and the winners,
pay their submitted bids. Bidders are likely to invest (or bid) based
on how they believe their rivals will act. As a result, this tends to
result in an escalation of bids, or bidding war. In turn, the pattern
of bidding may result in social waste-there may be excessive
quantities of investment (or bids) such that the aggregate amount
may exceed the value of the prize. 106 Today, the Tullock Auction is
rarely applied to modern legal problems.
Vickrey Auction. (Sealed bid, Second-price Auction). This
variation on the simple auction is attributed to William Vickrey. 
107
It was intended as a mechanism to auction a single, indivisible
good. Here potential bidders submit sealed written bids. While the
highest bidder wins the good, she only pays the next highest bid.
Thus all bidders have an incentive to bid closer to the true value of
the good, but do not risk paying that full value. This type of
auction is not widely used. Furthermore, it is subject to, inter alia,
the following defects: manipulation by shill bids or collusion
among parties.
Reverse Auction (Procurement Auction). In this type of auction,
the traditional roles of the seller and the buyer are reversed. Here
the goal is to minimize the price of the object-for example, a
government procurement contract. The bidders compete, on the
basis of price, to win the seller's business by offering the lowest
price. 108
Although we may generally think of auctions as a means to sell a
single, indivisible object, auctions also make possible the sale of multiple
106 Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An
Alternative Measurement qf Damages Under Civil RICO, 33 VILL. L. REv. 239, 253
(1988).
107 See generally Vickrey, supra note 101.
10 Patent attorneys are becoming increasingly familiar with these auctions, as some
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identical items (e.g., the government's sale of treasury bonds). The auction
scenarios when there are some number ("N") of bidders and multiple
("m") objects lend themselves to some highly interesting variations. The
rules of the game may be designed to permit varying degrees of
communication among the bidders, efficiency of the transaction, or
revenue goals, as with any auction. Since numerous bidders and multiple
objects may result in more than one winner, the question is what price
each successful bidder pays. This price may be determined in several
ways, including the Tullock Auction's paradigm of every winner paying
their respective bids or Vickrey's methodology of all winning bidders
paying the next highest bid. Another viable variation is for all of the
winning bids to pay the same price, namely the lowest accepted bid.109 It
may seem counterintuitive to envision an auction system where the lowest
bid wins the goods offered for sale. Yet in the context of an auction for a
public service, where the primary goal is not necessarily to generate the
most revenue, it is a viable alternative.
With this brief background in game theory, one can endeavor to
design a set of rules concerning an auction of PTO examination slots for
an enhanced examination regime. The following is a scenario of applicants
who are submitting numerous applications ("N") and competing for
multiple objects ("m"), namely examination slots. In the circumstance
where N < m, no auction would be necessary. The number of examination
slots is equal to or surpasses the number of applications submitted. In
other words, the supply does not exceed the demand. In contrast, in the
circumstance where N > m, the demand does exceed the available supply.
Under my proposal, if demand exceeds supply, the PTO should conduct an
auction to allocate the finite number of available examination slots among
applications.
For the purposes of this hypothetical example, the number of
examination slots should be allocated according to fields of technology. If
all inventors must compete with inventors in all other fields of technology
for auction slots, an auction could result in an undesirable allotment of
slots to a particular type of technology. Stated slightly differently, if
inventors of mechanical inventions have to compete with inventors of
pharmaceutical inventors, and if pharmaceutical inventors have more cash,
too many slots may be assigned to pharmaceutical inventors. Hence, one
must focus on the capacity of the Technology Center ("TC") or its
constituent art units, rather than the PTO as a whole, when determining the
number of slots available. 110 Because the PTO has divided its examination
corps and operations among the current TCs, each with their own
109 For a general discussion of this variety of auction, see Vickrey, supra note 101, at 93-
96.
110 A "technology center" is an organizational division of the PTO wherein its assigned
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technological focus, it seems appropriate for each TC to conduct its own
auction.111 It is interesting that, for the most part, all of the TCs experience
similar workload problems. This conclusion is evident from the Chart 1,
below:
CHART 1.112
TC 1600 C 1700 T 2100 T 2600 T 2800 R 3600 R 3700 Tota
ew 55,402 63,923 71,778 97,380 77,651 56,738 65,005 508,878 18,451
ppl)1ications.'30 2004
ew 62,644 72.697 76,529 115,585 94,425 70,354 83,225 586,580 24,534
ppl)1icaltions
Overall 95,006 105,447 102,440 138,822 137,458 101.097 108.039 809,323 27,599
ppl)1ications.'





The capacity of a PTO TC depends upon a variety of factors,
number of examiners and their level of experience. 113
such as the
... These Technology Centers include "1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry,"
"1700 Chemical and Materials Engineering," "2100 Computer Architecture,
Software, & Information Security," "2600 - Communications," "2800 Semiconductors,
Electrical and Optical Systems and Components," "2900 Designs," -'3600 -
Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security and
License and Review," and "3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and
Products." See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Examination,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/patexam.htm.
112 This chart was developed by U.S. PTO Commissioner John Doll in 2006. See
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/chicagoslides-back.ppt# 1.
"New Application inventory" is the number of new applications designated or assigned to
a technology center awaiting a first action. "Overall Pending Application inventory" is
the total number of applications designated or assigned to a TC in an active status. The
numbers include new applications; rejected applications awaiting an examiner's
response; amended applications; applications under appeal or interference; suspended
applications; reexams and allowed applications awaiting grant publication. Total
inventory includes applications not assigned to a particular TC, awaiting processing
either pre- or post-examination.
113 Under PTO operational procedures, it is assumed that an experienced examiner can
accomplish their task in fewer hours than a junior examiner, and an individual's goals are
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Following is an example of how my proposal could work in
practice. Let us suppose that the PTO determines that for a given time
period, a given TC has the ability to accept and the capacity to examine a
preset number of applications. The preset number of application slots will
be allocated efficiently through an auction process. A minimum reserve
bid of $310 is established by the PTO. 114 If demand for slots equals or
does not exceed the supply, all of the applications could be accepted for
examination, and each bidder would pay the basic application fee
currently in place. However, if demand for the slots exceeds supply, each
bidder will submit bids for application slots that range from $311 (for this
example) to one-million dollars. If the preset number of slots is forty, the
top forty bidders will have their applications examined. Under the rule of
the lowest bid accepted, each will pay the lowest bid of the lot. 115 One
could speculate how high these bids could be in light of the fact that the
cost of obtaining a patent, measured in terms of legal fees, appears to
range from $10 - $30,000 per patent and beyond. 116 The answer will
depend on the type of technology at issue and the strength of the invention
in the eyes of the applicant. Again, the goal of the auction process is to
filter the inferior applications so as to permit a more focused examination,
not to generate the most revenue for the federal treasury.
Numerous advantages arise from this focused system of
examination. The efficient allocation of examination slots distributes
scarce examination resources in a superior way. This optimization will
immediately focus scarce examination resources on a smaller set of more
worthy applications and will in turn enhance overall patent quality. The
auction helps weed out those patents of foreseeably little economic value
or industrial importance. In a similar fashion, it dissuades the users of the
114 As a basis for comparison, the current PTO fee schedule prescribes the following
initial patent filing fees: utility patents, $310, design patents, $210, and plant patents
$210. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fee Schedule,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2007september30 2007decl7.htm.
Additionally, various other application fees and surcharges apply based on the size and
complexity of the application. For the purposes of this example, these additional fees are
immaterial as the goal of the auction is to determine the basic number of applications that
the PTO will review.
115 The obvious criticism is the case where there is a tie among the set of bidders, e.g., the
top forty-one bidders in a competition for forty slots all submit the same bid. This might
occur due to collusion or some extraordinary coincidence. The auction rules could be
designed in a number of ways to deal with such a scenario, e.g., using a random coin flip
as a tie breaker. Since the goal of the auction is not to maximize revenue, but rather to
ration examination resources, the most prudent rule would be for all of the bidders to lose
the auction. The unused slots would be carried over to the next cycle, arguably lowering
the bidding pressure during the next periodic auction. This has the additional benefit of
dissuading collusion among bidders.
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patent system from making it into a lottery with applications with specious
claims for worthless inventions.
Another virtue of this proposal is that it limits the growth of the
PTO by foregoing the need to hire additional examiners. The PTO has
made it clear that the effort to recruit, hire, and retain these employees is a
strain on the organization. 117 The continuing need for new examiners is
unsustainable for a variety of other reasons. First, all examiners must be
qualified in their art unit. In some categories of technology, for example
semiconductor technology, an insufficient number of recent U.S. citizen
engineering graduates are available. The PTO is reported to hire one-third
of all recent graduates in this field. This massive government hiring of
these engineers and scientists results in an enormous societal cost. As a
society, we certainly would prefer for young scientists and engineers to be
inventing new technologies and starting entrepreneurial ventures rather
than becoming bureaucrats examining the inventions and granting the
patents of foreign technologists. The PTO's practice of massive hiring also
results in additional costs to the federal treasury (e.g., pension liability), as
well as other state and local costs (e.g., highway congestion).
An additional benefit arises through the course of the auctions: the
market will inevitably set the patent application fee closer to the actual
value of examination, rather than what an antiquated, bureaucratic fee
schedule determines.
B. OBJECTIONS
This Article's proposal will inevitably engender a number of
objections. It is admittedly a significant departure from the patent system
that has existed for the last two hundred years. As with any system of such
longevity, any proposed change will be resisted by the various
constituencies that have become entrenched around the status quo. The
case that the status quo is unsustainable cannot be emphasized enough. For
brevity's sake, the Article will now attempt to rebut the three most likely
objections to the proposal herein.
1. RATIONING INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY?
The first and most obvious objection to this Article's proposal is
that it may appear to stifle inventors or to ration creativity through the
auction and bidding process. In truth, a patent system that takes more than
ten years to grant an application is of limited real use to inventors and the
public. Similarly, a patent system that grants a substantial number of poor
quality patents is not of very much benefit to the public or industry. I
offer the following additional feature in the interest of mitigating any
perceived harshness of the proposal. As one of the initial conditions of the
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auction, every bidder, whether winner or loser, will obtain intellectual
property rights, albeit in a vehicle more limited than the traditional patent
(e.g., a petty patent). As a consolation prize for the applicant who does not
obtain an examination slot through the auction process, he or she would
obtain an alternative form of protection for the invention at stake by
registering for inventive protection (e.g, a petty patent). While critics who
believe that issuing too many patents makes them worthless do not
endorse a "pure registration" system, 118 many accept that a viable
compromise solution is a hybrid registration-examination system. 
119
2. THE FAIRNESS OF BIG VS. SMALL ENTITIES COMPETING
This Article's proposal will inevitably prompt some critics to
question the fairness of a market-based approach, specifically that it
potentially pits entities of vastly disparate resources raises against small
entities. Under the current patent system's fee schedule, small entities are
given a generous benefit. The Patent Act permits certain "small entities" -
i.e., small businesses, independent inventors, and non-profit organizations
- to receive a fifty percent discount on many of PTO fees. 120 Today this
discount is utilized by a wide array of entities, such as small companies,
universities, and the independent inventor working out of her garage. The
fact of the matter is that this discount is also widely abused. According to
the definition used by the PTO, for example, any organization with 500
employees or less, including a small dot-com with a billion dollars in
revenues, can receive the preferred treatment intended for the benefit of a
small college or the true independent garage-based inventor.
It must be emphasized that this Article's proposed system is not
primarily intended to increase revenue; rather, it is to optimize operations.
The spirit of the current fee reduction can be imported into the hybrid-
slotting system. The number of examination slots can be allocated
between the "big guys" and the "small entities." This dual-track thus
prevents a large corporation (e.g., General Electric or IBM) and a small
start-up or an independent inventor from bidding against one another.
Again, I contend that this proposal in fact greatly benefits the small
business and independent inventor because the current system is badly
11 F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics qf
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55 (2003).
119 See Lemley, supra note 62, at 1527 (citing the Japanese system of deferring
examination).
120 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006).
121 IBM is used as an example here because it has ranked as the number one recipient of
U.S. patents for from 1993-2005. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Calendar Year
2005 Preliminary List of Top Patenting Organizations,
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overtaxed to the point of being futile, if not absurd, in many cases-
namely, waiting ten years for a patent is not a rational investment of one's
entrepreneurial efforts.
3. POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY
The next objection to this proposal will likely come from the
political sphere. Recall that a central theme of this Article is that any
viable legislative patent reform must be able to survive the scrutiny of the
political process. Recent congressional attempts at patent reform illustrate
the lesson that all politics are local. Each member of Congress desires to
be a champion of their local political constituency, whether it is a small
manufacturing company or a research university. Research universities
and foundations have played a large role in the patent reform debate.
Today, universities have sophisticated patent programs and technology
transfer programs often receiving substantial numbers of patents on a
yearly basis and millions of dollars in licensing revenue. Yet, they are
politically sacred cows. Universities are likely to insist that the proposal
will significantly add to the expense of their patent prosecution budgets.
This objection is easily resolved by reserving a number of examination
slots for every private and public university and research foundation each
year. 122 Likewise, a number of examination spots could be reserved for
entities of different categories (e.g., the "micro-inventor") while
preserving the overall bidding system structure.
Similarly, just as this changes the patent system, it could also
impact the market for legal services. During the consideration of the
proposed fee bill, the patent bar was especially vocal in its opposition.
Many concluded that the patent bar considers it to be a zero-sum game-
the higher the fees charged by the PTO, the less money available in
corporate patent department budgets for legal fees. This is a short-sighted
argument in light of the fact that the current application inventory is so
heavily strained and only getting worse. The Author argues that this
proposal is politically expedient because the key political constituencies
within the system (i.e., the patent bar, the PTO unions, and the technology
industry) will be no worse off, if not in a better position. The patent bar
can still charge clients to prepare applications; the unionized examiners
will have more time for each application reviewed; and industry will have
more thoroughly reviewed applications reviewed in a shorter amount of
time. Many poor applications will be discouraged from entering a greatly
122 The USPTO website has traditionally published a list of the top ten U.S. universities
receiving patents each year. See, e.g.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/06-24.htm. The very mature technology
transfer programs such as the University of California receive more than 250 patents each
year. Outside of the top ten recipients, however, most U.S. universities receive fewer than
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stressed system. Most importantly, the plague of impractically large
backlogs and long patent pendency may finally be eliminated.
Obviously this is not an exhaustive list of concerns and objections.
Another relevant question is whether this change to the system risks a
violation of the United States' international obligations under various
treaties (e.g., Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPs")),
as many foreign nations and trading partners with strong industrial policy
and faithful TRIPs signatories have "petty patent" or other registration
systems. 124
V. CONCLUSION
Economists often theorize about the state of the world or a given
economic system in terms of "perfect happiness" or "perfect misery."
Certainly the chorus of voices surrounding the PTO's current woes --
ranging from allegations of an unfortunate patent quality quagmire to its
self-professed workload crisis -- places it far from the state of "perfect
happiness." The patent system and its diverse participants, including
inventors, infringers, government regulators, and PTO employees,
comprise an enormously complex system. Game theory cannot guarantee a
panacea.125 But it will very likely help in the long and elusive quest for a
twenty-first century patent system. Without a doubt, less is more, and,
accordingly a more perfect patent system is one that is more efficient and
provides for the superior examination of fewer, more worthy applications.
Tools from applied economics and game theory might be used to engineer
a more optimal, if not perfect, patent system.
This Article presents a new patent examination paradigm. In order
to cross the threshold from a quaint proposal to a reality, the Article also
articulates the proposal's inherent benefits so as to pass the scrutiny of the
political process. Despite the elegance of auctions for certain public sector
uses and their proponents from the economics and game theory academy,
some may have objections to my proposed model in this domain. As the
status quo at the PTO is clearly untenable, the question is which, if any, of
the proposed alternatives can rehabilitate a system replete with serious
patent quality and workload issues. Most importantly, the socio-economic
123 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 14, 1994 (GATT Secretariat 1994), Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. For the adoption of TRIPS by the United
States, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 (H.R. 5110), Dec. 8,
1994.
124 See generally supra note 92.
125 Game theorists point out that "[n]o one of these theories should be expected to be a
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goals that are at the heart of the nation's economy are at stake when it
comes to the functionality of the patent system. Economic theory can help
private and public institutions implement more efficient processes, better
allocate resources, minimize waste, and develop better patterns of use.
Whereas most of the economic analysis regarding the patent system
focuses on value in terms of profit for the patentee, rather than societal
benefits, improved operation of the patent system is likely to enhance
welfare for all participants, improve the nation's economy, and provide
new societal benefits (e.g., externalities) flowing from patenting activity.
The use of game theory in the public sphere is well-established and
has a long pedigree. One of the key tools in the current public law and
economics arsenal is the Coase Theorem. This game theory principle
states, in essence, that a system will ultimately organize in an
economically efficient manner in the presence of externalities. 126 History
confirms that game theory principles, such as the Coase Theorem, can
play a role in improving public policy. In the 1950s, the FCC evaluated
the era's bureaucratic and ineffective allocation mechanism of radio
spectrum. Professor Coase testified before the FCC and proposed a
theorem based on economic allocation. In response, a perplexed FCC
Commissioner, Philip S. Cross, asked: "Is this all a big joke?" 127 Not only
did Professor Coase eventually win the Nobel Prize for economics-
ultimately, the FCC adopted his system for the market allocation of radio
spectrum rights. 128
As with many elements of modern society, the patent system may
be viewed through an economic prism: a representation of a set of choices
and investments (e.g., resources, time, money, and risks). The touchstone
of the patent system is innovation. The PTO is interposed between the
public and the frontiers of knowledge and industry. If the body politic
cannot host an honest discussion about the defects of the patent system
and accept the case for necessary reform, even if it is a significant
departure, the system will remain broken for at least the next generation, if
not beyond. The challenge is keeping the PTO from becoming a bigger
federal agency or spending more appropriated funds as a way out of its
problems. Rather, it is about being smarter in its constitutionally-based
126 R.H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 8 (1995) ("1 argued that in a
competitive system there would be an optimum of planning since a firm ... could only
continue to exist if it performed its coordination function at a lower cost that would be
incurred if co-ordination were achieved by means of market transactions and also at a
lower cost than this same function being performed by another firm. To have an efficient
economic system it is necessary ... we find as a result of [such] competition ... This is
what I said in my article of 1937 ... I could never have imagined that these ideas would
some sixty years later become a major justification for the award of a Nobel prize.").
127 Gerald R. Faulhaber, The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management, and
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mission to advance the useful arts and sciences for the public and the
nation. 
129
121 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent and Copyright Clause); see also supra note 5.
403
44









































130 Data from the years 1883 to 1930 was compiled from the following source: Condition
of Work in the U.S. Patent Qffice, supra note 37, at 168. Data from years 1931 to 2007
was compiled from USPTO Annual Performance and Accountability Reports, available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/index.html.
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